The Greek Army in Asia Minor 1920-22: the British view

The Greek Army in Asia Minor 1920-22: the British view

The untimely death of young Greek King Alexander on October 25, 1920 and the unexpected electoral loss of Eleftherios Venizelos on November 14 to the Royalists led by Dimitrios Rallis changed the military fortunes of Greece in Asia Minor. The differences among the Entente Powers- Great Britain, France and Italy- assisted the Kemalists position in their war with the Greeks.

When the Greek people voted overwhelmingly for the return of King Constantine (the father of the deceased young monarch) in the December 5 plebiscite, the Entente powers terminated its financial support to Greece. The Greek army was left to fend for itself in Asia Minor without the financial and moral support of the Allies. It will be noted that on December 1-2, 1916 Royalist troops and Anglo-French marines clashed in Athens. During this brief encounter some Allied marines were killed and wounded. King Constantine had failed to hand over mountain batteries that had been demanded by the Entente. In particular the French never forgot this event and were openly hostile to the return of Constantine to Greece.

In order to win the confidence of the Entente, the Royalist administration was determined to continue with the foreign policy of Venizelos and to demonstrate the ability of the Greek army to defeat the Turkish nationalists led by Mustapha Kemal Pasha. However the Royalists committed a major policy blunder by replacing experienced Venizelist officers with inexperienced Royalist appointees. Some 1500 Royalist officers were either reinstated to their former senior ranks or promoted ahead of Venizelists who had their promotions held up. This caused resentment within the officer ranks of the Greek army.

With the change of government in Athens, the British General Staff doubted the ability of the Greeks to hold onto to Smyrna, this would have exposed the Allies in Constantinople to potential Turkish Nationalist attacks across the Ismid Peninsula and the Dardanelles. For the Allies to strengthen their position in Constantinople, it would have been necessary to raise extra troops at a time of domestic economic retrenchment and the unwillingness of the Allies to accept additional military commitments in the Near and Middle East.

The British General Staff suggested to the British Cabinet that it make generous concessions to Kemal in order to wean him away from the Bolsheviks. They regarded Turkey as a natural barrier for containing Bolshevism and also pacifying Muslim unrest in India, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Egypt and Palestine. The judgment of the British General Staff on the inability of the Greek army to eliminate the Kemalists was to be vindicated in the long run.

During February-March 1921, the Allies and the protagonists (the Greeks and two Turkish delegations - the Sultan's government in Constantinople and Angora administration) met in London to find a peaceful solution to the Near East imbroglio and also to modify the un-ratified Treaty of Sevres. The Greek delegation headed by Prime Minister Kalogeroulos told the Allied Powers that the Kemalist army was " a rabble worthy of little or no consideration." On February 19 Colonel Sarayiannis, the Chief of the Asia Minor General Staff, told the conference that the Greek army could annihilate the Kemalists and sweep the country clear within three months. General Gouraud, the French Commander in Syria and Cilicia, did not agree with the Greek description of belittling and underestimating the fighting quality of the Turkish soldier. After all the French army of occupation in Cilicia withstood a ferocious Turkish nationalist attack at Marash in February 1920 which resulted in the death of some 10,000 Armenians.

The French and Italians used the London Conference to conduct secret negotiations with the Kemalists. On March 11 Aristide Briand, the French Premier, and Bekir Sami Bey, the Angora Foreign Minister, reached an agreement for the evacuation of French troops from Cilicia, the exchange of prisoners of war, the rectification of the Turkish-Syrian frontier and mining concessions. The second discussion of March 13 between Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister and Bekir Sami provided for the 'economic collaboration' between nationalist Turkey and Italy in the Adalia (Anatalya) hinterland and awarding the Heraclea coal mines to an Italian group. Italian troops would also be withdrawn from Turkish soil. Bekir Sami was dismissed as Foreign Minister, after his return to Angora, for exceeding his authority and having failed to consult with the Grand National Assembly.

As the London Conference failed to find a peaceful solution, the Greek offensive began in late March 1921. The Greek army advanced on two fronts: the southern group pushed forward from Ushak towards Afion Karahissar and the northern group set out from Bursa. The northern group encountered very stiff Turkish resistance and by March 31, the Greeks were forced to order a general retreat to their lines near Bursa. In the meantime, the southern group had captured Afion Karahissar on March 27, 1921. Lacking troop numbers and experiencing transport difficulties the Turks were ordered to turn south, with the prime objective of cutting the railway line between Afion Karahissar and Ushak in order to isolate the southern group. The Greeks escaped the Turkish net and returned to their base at Ushak. The Greek military setback of March 1921 was due to over-confidence, inadequate planning and excessive haste. The royalist officers lacked the experience to handle their men in action.

From this moment onwards, the Entente declared its neutrality in the Greek-Turkish war. With this unexpected military reversal, the Greeks would use the months of April to June to re-equip, change the leadership and re-organise its army for the major assault on Angora (Ankara), the capital of nationalist Turkey. Colonel Nairne, the British military attaché in Athens, visited Smyrna in early June and was impressed by the efficiency, organisation and morale of the Greek army. In July the Greek army launched its summer offensive and had initial success in capturing the towns of Eskishehir, Afion Karahissar and Kutahia.

The critical decision to attack Angora was made on July 28, 1921 in Kutahia at a meeting attended by King Constantine, Generals' Papoulas, Commander-in-Chief of Greek Army in Asia Minor, Dousmanis and Stratigos, Colonel Pallis, Gounaris, the Prime Minister, and Theotokis, the Minister for War. The politicians Gounaris and Theotokis and Generals Dousmanis and Stratigos decided that the Greek army should resume its offensive and advance onto Angora. Pallis and Papoulas expressed doubts over this scheme and King Constantine offered no views. It is interesting to note that earlier in April, Ioannis Metaxas believed victory to be impossible and had no confidence in continuing the war in Asia Minor.

On August 14, the Greek army began its long march across the central Anatolian plateau experiencing hot days ands chilly nights. It was not until August 24 that they had come into contact with the Turks. The shortages of ammunition, food and water, bad maps and poor reconnaissance coupled with the Greek troops falling ill through malaria and heat exhaustion compounded the difficulties faced by the Greek army. By September 23 the Greeks retreated to the Afion Karahissar, Eskishehir-Karakeui line. The Greek army had failed to occupy Angora and would now be involved in a long stalemate.

The French seized the opportunity to come to terms with the Kemalists. The French parliament could no longer bear the economic burden of maintaining an army of 80,000 men in Cilicia. Therefore Briand dispatched to Turkey M.Franklin-Bouillon, a French journalist and Turcophile Senator, in September 1921, empowered by the French Government to negotiate with Angora over French troop evacuation, the release of French prisoners, the protection of minorities and economic concessions. This mission led to much recrimination between London and Paris. When French evacuated its troops from Cilicia, they left behind war materiel that Kemalists employed against the Greeks in August 1922.

Greece would now turn to Great Britain to act as a mediator in order to seek a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Greeks distrusted French and Italians position in Asia Minor. In late October 1921 Curzon the British Foreign Secretary met Gounaris, the Greek Prime Minister and Baltazzis, the Foreign Minister, in London and told them that " We were sacrificing our imperial interests. British policy must be decided by the largest consideration." Curzon reminded the Greek delegation that the Sevres settlement had to be replaced with a new peace treaty. After securing Greek cooperation in accepting Allied mediation, Curzon's diplomatic efforts were frustrated by the Franklin-Bouillon agreement and the accession of new French Premier Raymond Poincare in January 1922. The latter employed stalling tactics to Curzon's peace initiatives. Poincare was a known Turcophile.

At the Paris Conference held on March 22-26, 1922 Lord Curzon, applied his diplomatic skills in trying to achieve a peace settlement to the Greek-Turkish conflict. The Greek government intimated its acceptance of the armistice but not its conditions. On the other hand Angora had not accepted anything and returned evasive and defiant answers that were clearly designed to delay proceedings. The Turks were secretly preparing its army for one final military assault against its enemy. The Greeks would not withdraw from Asia Minor unless firm guarantees were given for the protection of Christian minorities from Turkish reprisals.

A diplomatic solution to the conflict now seemed out of question. In late July 1922 the Greeks asked the allies for their permission to occupy Constantinople in order to force Kemal's hand. The Allies denied the Greek request. Lord Balfour, the acting British Foreign Secretary in place of the ill Lord Curzon, thought the Greek action to be insane whereas Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, thought the " Greeks were 50% bluffing and 50% serious."

Kemal launched the last and successful offensive in the Greek-Turkish war on August26, 1922. His troops attacked on a 30-mile (45-kilometre) front breaking through the sectors of Afion Karahissar and Sarran. Kemal's strategy was to cut the Greek army at several points, thus preventing its re-grouping and leading to its collapse in Asia Minor. As the Greeks retreated towards Smyrna and the Asia Minor coast, they asked Great Britain in early September to arrange for an armistice. When Curzon informed Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, of the Greek debacle, the latter doubted the veracity of the story. Addressing the House of Commons on August 4, Lloyd George praised Greek army in the most laudable terms. He stated that "...He did not know of any other army that could have gone so far as the Greeks had gone. It was daring enterprise. They established their military superiority in every encounter and they were only beaten by the combination of the country and the long lines of communication that had to be maintained. " The Greek High Command took the speech to heart as paying tribute to their brave and heroic feats.

Now we pose the important question in the Greek-Turkish conflict. Why did the Greek army collapse in Asia Minor? There are four reasons why this happened. Firstly, the Greeks were surprised by the Turkish offensive, as its cavalry failed to keep surveillance of the whole Turkish frontier; secondly the overstretched Greek lines of communication between General Headquarters in Smyrna and the front were hazardous as the Turks could easily cut vital telegraphic and telephone lines; thirdly the activities of Greek communist officers spreading propaganda undermined the morale of the army; and finally the late British historian Douglas Dakin said that " the disaster must be attributed to a failure of command and not the lack of fighting quality on the part of the Greek soldier."

In conclusion, the British General Staff's opinion of the Greek army being unable to eliminate Mustapha Kemal was vindicated. They believed that the British Government had backed " the wrong horse" in the conflict.

Stavros T.Stavridis Historical Researcher, National Centre for Hellenic Studies and Research, Latrobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia